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Digital Economy

Challenges and opportunities of the digital economy in Indonesia

This article was originally published in Medium.

Indonesia aims to become the biggest digital economy nation in ASEAN by aiming to reach 130 million US$ of e-commerce transaction in 2020. This may sound ambitious, but the fact that a majority of Indonesians are digitally oriented makes the government strongly believe that the target can be achieved. The latest data from Asosiasi Penyedia Jasa Internet Indonesia (APJII) and We Are Social revealed that there are 143,26 million internet users in Indonesia in 2017, and a majority of them use mobile devices to access the internet. Moreover, the total number of mobile connection has exceeded the Indonesian populations, with each citizen have approximately 2 to 3 SIM cards.

What are the underlying factors that drive this enormous growth? I would argue that there are at least four factors:

  1. Technological advancement particularly in the telecommunication sector. Initially, we can only use a mobile phone for voice call and SMS. These days, both services are not popular anymore as people prefer to use instant messaging and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). This also applies for the handset that we use today, as it becomes smarter and capable of doing a wide range of tasks compared to a classical feature phone.
  2. Increase coverage of a mobile network. There is a fierce competition among operators to become the best in the country through massive infrastructure deployment. As a result, more and more people now have an access to the internet.
  3. Price of ICT is getting cheaper. There is a price war between each operator by lowering the price of internet services in order to maximize network utilization. Also, we can easily find a high-quality smartphone with an affordable price. As a result, telecommunication is not a luxury good anymore.
  4. Social media and instant messaging as “killer apps”. The introduction of Blackberry Messenger (BBM), Facebook and Twitter in Indonesia played a key role in boosting data penetration in the country.

Despite the growing trends of digital in Indonesia, we still face a significant challenge in narrowing the digital divide. Around 77 per cent of internet users are centred in Java and Sumatra, and less than half of citizens in eastern part of the country do not have access to the internet. As a result, Indonesia still lags behind our neighbour countries like Thailand and Malaysia when it comes to global indexes such as Networked Readiness Index (NRI) or GSMA Mobile Connectivity Index.

The digital divide in Indonesia (Source: Open Signal)

The development impact of the digital economy

The aforementioned infrastructure challenges apparently do not hamper the promising growth of the digital economy in Indonesia. At the time of writing, Indonesia has nearly 2,000 start-ups and only behind USA, India, UK and Canada. Interestingly, the majority of those start-ups are led by “millennials” that are passionate to create social impact by harnessing the power of digital technologies. This can be seen from how Nadiem Makarim is successfully growing Go-Jek to empower not only “ojek” drivers but also SMEs and consumers. Go-Pay, mobile wallet system developed by Go-Jek, even contributes in promoting financial inclusion in Indonesia. Another example is evident from how William Tanuwijaya initiates Tokopedia as a platform to enables everyone in starting their own business for free. Both Go-Jek and Tokopedia, together with Traveloka and Bukalapak, are known as start-up unicorn in Indonesia.

So, how does the digital economy contribute to economic growth?

Admittedly, the contribution of the ICT sector to GDP in Indonesia is still not significant with only 7.2 per cent. However, the GDP growth from this sector is the highest compared to other sectors with 10 per cent of GDP growth. In fact, this number is much higher than average GDP growth of Indonesia that only reached 5 per cent.

In other report published by Oxford Economics (2016) revealed that by 2020 every one per cent increase in mobile penetration can contribute in creating additional 640 million US$ to Indonesia’s GDP as well as opening up 10,700 additional job opportunities. Hence, it is no surprise that the government has put significant attention to the digital economy sector.

Speaking of the digital economy, there are at least three emerging trends that are currently happening: on-demand services, financial technology, and e-commerce.

  1. On-demand services. It is impossible to talk about this sector without mentioning Go-Jek, one of the most influential tech start-up in Indonesia. They not only managed to revolutionalize “ojek”, but they also successfully influence behavioural change in our society. Essentially, they facilitate almost everything on-demand, from logistics, food delivery, car wash, and even beauty services. They are now in the process of preparing their own streaming service, which could cement Go-Jek’s position in providing anything that Indonesians need.
  2. Financial technology. There is a clear challenge in bringing financial services to everyone in Indonesia. Only about one in three adults in Indonesia have access to financial services. In this regard, Financial Technology (Fintech) played an important role not only as an enabler for the digital economy but also promoting financial inclusion through technology. This is evident particularly within the case of a peer-to-peer lending platform that enables small business to get access to financial capital. Another example is how the mobile payment serves as a mean to promote a cashless society in Indonesia.
  3. E-commerce. More than 8 million Indonesians loved to shop online, and the numbers are expected to increase in the near future. This is driven by both consumptive and online behaviour of Indonesians as well as the increasing market reach thanks to social media and technology. As a result, many stores are now trying to sell their products through both online and offline channel. People can now buy almost anything easily through their smartphone without having to go to the actual stores, and we can receive our products within hours with the help of instant courier. In the future, we can expect further innovation such as an unmanned store that will transform the way we shop.

Conclusion

Indonesia has a great potential to become the biggest digital economy nation in ASEAN, even in the world. But, achieving this target requires various stakeholders involved to overcome the following challenges:

  1. Narrowing the digital divide. Infrastructure is an important enabler in maximizing the benefit of the digital economy, so the government must ensure that everyone can have an equal access to technology. Palapa Ring project is a great starting point, and the quality of our infrastructure will surely get better by the time the project is finished in 2019. But the infrastructure deployment cannot stop there and should focus on providing access to rural areas in Indonesia.
  2. Digital talent. There is still a mismatch between the supply of university graduates and the demand from tech start-up. This leads to talent war, in which many start-ups have to compete in securing high-quality talents that are lacking in the market. Hence, a collaboration between industry and academia is important to ensure the production of high-quality digital talent that meets the needs of the digital industry.
  3. Regulations. It is no secret that regulations are always behind technological advancement, as can we see from the case of Go-Jek and Grab. What we need is a guiding principle in designing regulations for those emerging technology. It should be designed in such a way that it will not hamper creativity and innovation in tackling societal challenges. Several cybersecurity issues should be taken into account, particularly about consumer protection of personal data.
Digital Economy

Policy to Support Digital Trade & the Digital Economy

This post is written by Christopher Foster and Shamel Azmeh (University of Manchester). It was originally posted on the GEG Africa blog

The global economy is experiencing important technological shifts with the rise of digital technology a key driver. These changes are likely to intensify in the coming years with new technologies that are emerging such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and autonomous vehicles.

For developing and emerging economies, the digital economy provides an opportunity to achieve economic and technological catching-up through using digital technologies and building capacities. But, technological shifts may also widen the technological divide with advanced economies weakening the position of developing economies in global value chains and making ongoing catching-up efforts ineffective.

To explore these issues further, we have recently be undertaking research which aims to offer direction in terms of constructing overall policy strategy in developing and emerging economies, in partnership with the Global Economic Governance Africa project, focussing on South Africa.

Policy models for digital

Drawing on our analysis of digital policy, we highlight two important directions that countries have taken around digital policies. This model extends a previous working papers by Bukht & Heeks produced as part of the DIODE project.

Broader liberal strategies for enabling markets for digital trade highlight the importance of developing the national regulation and conditions to maximise diffusion and impacts of digital products and services into the country. This includes, for instance, creating conditions to attract foreign digital firms and ensuring that benefits are evenly distributed by increasing the digital participation of marginalised groups.

On their own, however, market enabling policies might not necessarily produce the desired economic objectives in terms of technology learning and localization. As such, we also consider a more selective approach which we refer to as digital catch-up policy. This second approach is more interventionist and strategic in nature and it requires higher political capital and knowledge in the policy-making process.

As shown below, the two directions are not mutually exclusive and potentially can be complementary.

framework2
Key approaches to digital policy (include specific areas of policy instrument).

The cases of Brazil and Indonesia

To expand and think about implications of such a policy model, we undertook two case studies of Brazil and Indonesia. These studies provide insights for how policy makers can regulate and deal with the challenges of the emerging digital economy.

Overall, directions of digital policy in these two countries have lots in common. Both countries already have core digital regulation and infrastructure in place and policy makers are working to refine policy to ensure that it fits with the rapidly evolving needs of the digital economy and digitalisation.

Moving beyond solely market enabling policies, we see that both countries focus on a number of strategic areas through interventionist policies. Not all of these initiatives have been effective and some carry costs, but in certain areas they have been associated with more vibrant local sectors that are helping build capacities and increase local economic value-added.

The two tables below expand on our findings, highlighting the broad range of instruments being used in the areas of the policy model (click for more details)

Implications for policy makers

South Africa  (and other emerging and developing countries) faces similar challenges in trying to bridge the technological and industrial gap with more advanced economies in a rapidly changing landscape.  At the same time there is a need to ensure that digital policy is inclusive to achieve broader societal outcomes.

A number of policy lessons can be learnt for South Africa from the cases of Brazil and Indonesia. Policies to enable growth in digital trade are important to provide the framework for the expansion of the digital economy. Underlying this, there must be substantive investments in broadband infrastructure and appropriate regulation. An emphasis on inclusion policies will lead to more broad-based benefits from the digital economy.

To support local firms, digital ecosystem policy is a crucial consideration in grounding the benefits of the digital economy. This includes policies to support the growth and scaling-up of start-ups, and the higher participation of MSMEs in digital trade. Furthermore, encouraging global digital firms to localize some of their activities and to build domestic linkages is an important policy objective. As the ‘disbenefits’ of the digital economy become clear, policy makers need to legislate to reduce challenges in areas such as tax, data protection and the platform economy. Reflecting the importance of scale, regional integration is crucial in terms of digital policy. Broader markets, interoperability and national-regional strategic alignments are key to expanding markets, attracting foreign firms, and potentially increasing their commitment to a region.

Digital catch-up policy provides an important direction for supporting digital growth. Our work reveals a broad range of potential catch-up policy instruments in the digital economy (e.g localisation, incentives, and national digital projects). Future examination should explore the specific catch-up policies that could be fruitful in the case of South Africa.

Two GEG policy papers will be released in Novermber 2018 providing further details on the policy model and the cases of Brazil & Indonesia

Digital Economy

The Developmental Value of Digital Platforms in the Global South

Digital platforms are used in the business models of many of the world’s biggest companies and they impact people across the globe in various ways. A survey conducted in 2015 identified 176 platform companies in the world, with an estimated global market capitalisation of $4.3bn — about the same as Sierra Leone’s gross domestic product. Areas such as employment opportunities, social interactions and transportation are increasingly organised through these platforms. Traditionally, most of the platforms and their main markets have been in the global North, yet companies and people from the global South are also adopting and using digital platforms to run their businesses and daily lives.

This raises important questions on the developmental implications of digital platforms. Recently, valuable research has looked into important areas of digital platforms, such as work conducted within the DIODE Network on digital labour, or on innovation ecosystems of open data platforms. As digital platforms continue to have ever-wider significance, further research is needed. A new DIODE working paper – Digital Platforms in the Global South: Foundations and Research Agenda – suggests that, in order to conduct meaningful research in the area, it is necessary to understand the foundations of digital platforms and the key factors of their functioning, as well as discussing their developmental implications.

Definitions matter: two types of digital platforms

The working paper distinguishes between two main types of digital platforms: transaction and innovation platforms. Transaction platforms, or exchange platforms, facilitate interactions between users by reducing transaction costs. They base their functioning on either direct or indirect network effects, where the former refer to a network (or platform) becoming more valuable to each member as more users join, and the latter to the value created when increasing the base of users in groups that are complementary to each other. Common transaction platforms are M-Pesa, Uber or AirBnB. The second type of digital platforms are innovation platforms, whose distinctive feature is to provide technological building blocks for developers to build services and products on top of them. Common innovation platforms are Android or Apple’s iOS.

DP_typology_blog
Typology of Digital Platforms

A research agenda to study digital platforms in the global South

Building on digital platforms’ typology and how they operate, the working paper puts forward and discusses four different research areas for studying the developmental role of digital platforms in the global South:

  • How to better release the developmental potential of innovation platforms, be that in the form of platform design, development or usage.
  • How digital platforms in the global South differ from the ones in the global North, and what kinds of institutional implications these platforms may have in a developing country context.
  • Do digital transaction platforms exacerbate or help to diminish existing inequalities in the global South?
  • What are the alternatives for current digital platforms, especially in cases when they function less than optimally in enabling development?

All of these areas aim to cover different aspects of digital platforms and development. Overall, digital platforms are likely to have both positive and negative implications for people in different locations of the world, and the impacts may come in various forms and differ from one context to another. Research on the topic is therefore crucial to understand these matters better and to help to steer the creation and functioning of digital platforms towards better developmental outcomes. The working paper provides a foundation for this type of research for scholars and other actors interested in the topic.

Digital Labour

The Continuing Relevance of the State in the Age of Digital Gig Work

Technological change has always had an impact on the sphere of work. Every new form of work that has emerged has been accompanied by optimism about its potential, and concerns about its damaging effects. The same is true of digital gig work – a form of work that can be performed and delivered digitally via online platforms. A primary concern has been the exploitative nature of digital gig work, especially the micro-distribution models in which individuals, as “contractors”, register with the platform to complete their tasks (Meyers et al, 2017). Although being able to work from anywhere, at one’s convenience, on a digital platform may offer certain flexibility, the absence of physically proximate fellow-workers also leads to the atomization of the workforce (Kuek et al, 2015). With the supply of labour exceeding demand, there are questions about the tendency of workers to undercut one another in their eagerness to obtain work, and whether that will lead to a race to the bottom in terms of wages, reduce the bargaining power of digital gig workers and perpetuate socio-spatial disparities (Graham et al, 2017).

Historically, including in the 20th century, states have taken an active developmental role to ensure improvements in labour conditions and in aggregate standards of living. Is it possible for the state to address similar concerns that arise in the context of digital gig work, when technology gives platforms a global reach? This is an urgent question as a 2016 study by the Oxford Internet Institute reveals that a significant share of the gig workforce is in the less affluent regions of the world, primarily undertaking menial and repetitive tasks, while two-thirds of job vacancies are posted by employers from the developed world, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada (Lehdonvirta, 2017).

Such demarcation between the source and destination of work, and the attendant concerns about the digital gig economy, are reminiscent of arguments about the New International Division of Labour (NIDL). NIDL theorists, such as Frobel et al (1980), were concerned with “bloody-Taylorization” following the growth in the offshoring of low-skill, low value-added manufacturing from the 1960s. Yet, for at least four Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) in East Asia – Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong – becoming a part of the NIDL offered a path to technological ‘catch-up’ and ‘late-industrialization’. Those NICs showed how, despite starting off with less-than-desirable work, it is possible to develop indigenous capability to move toward more high-skilled, higher value-added activity. In all these NICs, the dominant institutional force behind the socio-economic transformation was the state.

Amsden and Chu (2003), for instance, point to how Taiwan entered the world semiconductor market by offering low-skill assembly work. Over time, state investments in the education system and technological acquisition, its provision of financial incentives including tariffs and subsidies, and the building of physical infrastructure, created an industry which gave Taiwan a “second-mover advantage” and made the country the world’s leading semiconductor supplier. Specifically, firms pioneered the pure-play foundry, an organizational model in which they became adept at original design and manufacture without necessarily marketing their own brands. Thus, contrary to the fears of the NIDL theorists, the East Asian NICs showed that developing countries have the agency to move beyond exploitative niches in the international division of labour with technological upgrading. More broadly, this highlights that, while concerns about the impact of type and conditions of work on socio-spatial disparities are far from misplaced, there are also institutional means of overcoming these concerns.

The concentration of digital gig work in less affluent countries is largely due to a lack of better local job opportunities. Concerns about the precarious nature of digital gig work are equally true for locally available work in the vast informal sector, with gig work at least offering better monetary returns. But this is not an argument for the status quo. Rather, it is a call to draw from lessons about how institutional means, especially the state, can be deployed to ensure that menial and repetitive digital gig work becomes a stepping stone to more rewarding work and not the only choice arising out of a lack of other options.

One possible initiative by the state is to build, or assist private players in building platforms for local needs which can find global use. With such platforms within its jurisdiction, the state can regulate them to ensure adherence to socially acceptable norms of pay and work conditions. Local language platforms could be encouraged to ensure that digital gig work opportunities are available to a larger section of the population. To undertake such initiatives, the state must minimally promote what the East Asian NICs did so effectively to overcome the debilitating aspects of 20th century manufacturing – investment in education (to ensure employability) and physical infrastructure, financial incentives, and opportunities for ‘learning by doing’. Since current technology and global conditions differ from what they were 50 years ago, the specifics of state interventions will vary. But history suggests the state can play a useful role in harnessing the potential of digital gig work for social transformation. These trajectories and trends are explored at length by the author in a paper being written for the DIODE working paper series.

References
Amsden, A. and Chu, W-w. 2003. Beyond Late Industrialization: Taiwan’s Upgrading Policies. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

Frobel, F, J. Heinrichs, and O. Kreye. 1980. The New International Division of Labor: Structural Unemployment in Industrialised Countries and Industrialisation in Developing Countries. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Graham, M., V. Lehdonvirta, A. Wood, H. Barnard, I. Hjorth, and D. P. Simon. 2017. The Risks and Rewards of Online Gig Work At The Global Margins. https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/publications/ gigwork.pdf (accessed 24th June 2018).

Kuek, Siou Chew et. al. 2015. The Global Opportunity in Online Outsourcing. Washington D.C.: World Bank Group.

Lehdonvirta, V. 2017.Where are online workers located? The international division of digital gig work. http://ilabour.oii.ox.ac.uk/where-are-online-workers-located-the-international-division-of-digital-gig-work/ (accessed 24th June 2018)

Meyers, L., B. Minic, L. Raftree and T. Hurst. 2017. The Nexus of Microwork and Impact Sourcing: Implications for Youth Employment. http://gcyerti.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/The-Nexus-of-Microwork-and-Impact-Sourcing_Final_ONLINE_02.28.17_v2.pdf (accessed 25 May 2018)

Digital Labour

Development Implications of Digital Platform Labour

A new paper – “Understanding the Development Implications of Online Outsourcing: A Study of Digital Labour Platforms in Pakistan” – analyses the experiences of some of the millions of gig workers who undertake digital labour in developing countries via platforms such as Upwork and Freelancer.

Using the sustainable livelihoods framework as the basis for analysis, it identifies four things from interviews with workers and other stakeholders in remote areas of Northern Pakistan:

a) Employment Push: The context of politico-economic vulnerability that pushes unemployed individuals into digital work including lack of alternative employment, political instability and concerns about Islamic extremism.

b) Barriers to Gig Work: The typical barriers to digital gig work for those in more remote areas of developing countries. These include poor quality of technical infrastructure such as power and broadband connectivity; a lack of relevant knowledge and skills or the means to obtain them; limitations of current financial payment systems; and cultural norms that do not see online freelancing as constituting a “job”.

c) Worker Trajectories: The four trajectories of digital gig workers who go through training schemes: sinkers (the majority who never undertake digital platform work), strugglers (who try but appear largely unable to make a living), survivors (who can earn small amounts from digital gig work), and swimmers (who flourish and are able to build a career path via digital platforms).

d) Role of Institutions: The “re-institutionalisation” of digital labour. Notwithstanding narratives of the de-institutionalisation of digital gig work, experience in Pakistan shows three institutional forces impinging on online outsourcing to marginalised groups. There are the digital platforms themselves; often seen as improving the context for outsourcing work.  There are interventions of formal organisations – development, government and NGO agencies – who help overcome asset deficits that would otherwise exclude these groups from online outsourcing.  And there are informal linkages between freelancers themselves which provide assistance and work sub-contracts.

Digital Economy, Digital Enterprise, Digital Labour

Report from the Philippine Impact Sourcing Conference (PISCON)

The government of the Philippines through its Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT) conducted the second Philippine Impact Sourcing Conference (PISCON) in Cebu 3rd and 4th of May 2018.

A main objective of the conference was to celebrate the implementation of the Rural Impact Sourcing Technical Training (RISTT) program which DICT conducted across 26 different locations in 2017. More than 600 delegates were present, with a mix of local government officials and people from the online outsourcing business in the country. DICT plan to increase the number of locations for RISTT to 65 for 2018. According to DICT undersecretary Monchito Ibrahim, there has now been a shift among the local government officials, and while DICT previously had to push for them to help host training in particular locations, it is now the local government that come to DICT and ask if they can be one of the locations for such training.

While it can be debated whether such training is impact sourcing in the purest sense of the term (see this previous DIODE blog post), there is no doubt that this training has had an impact on individuals and that new (out)sourcing jobs have been created.

In some locations, a number of the trainees went together and started their own corporations. Two such examples are Narra Digital Solutions in Zamboanga City and DigiWorkz Carmona in Carmona, Cavite.

Zamboanga City is at the southernmost part of Mindanao, a region that is currently under martial law. As recently as 2013 there was a military conflict in the city. Two mothers, who previously had to leave their children to their extended family due to work responsibilities, together with their trainer, started Narra Digital Solutions. Their main target is to do IT jobs for local companies in the Zamboanga region. Also, they do advocacy and teach others, in particular, other single mothers, to do digital work. Previously there were few such opportunities in the area, which meant that the mothers had to leave the children with their family and go to places like Manila to work. By either working from home or an office close to home, they can now take care of their children and earn money at the same time. According to the founders, they can see how their children have a better life than they had before.

DigiWorkz was started by some of the trainees, in close cooperation with the local government in Carmona. The government helped with infrastructure and a building where the cooperative now work. Like Narra Digital Solutions, DigiWorkz also primarily work with local customers and have the ambition of helping to digitalize all local business in the area by 2020. One such business is Wellvise. Having got their website designed by DigiWorkz they are now able to attract customers from wider areas.

These are just two examples of how the trainees have used the skill they got during the training to create sustainable local jobs in their region. While previous research about impact sourcing has focused primarily on the customer, the impact sourcing vendor, and impact sourcing workers, the role of the government has not got that much attention. Further, the connection between training and small impact sourcing start-ups has hardly been researched at all.

Looking into how the creation of such smaller impact sourcing companies has an impact in the local society is part of my current doctoral project where I explore the wider impact of new forms of digital work at the Philippines. You can follow the project on my Facebook page.

Enzo and Jehan 1

Lorenzo Dupa (left) from DigiWorkz Carmona and Jehann Forro from Narra Digital Solutions discuss their experiences during PISCON

Digital Labour

Mobile Microwork in South Africa

When Richard launched the DIODE network, I took this as a cue to initiate a mini-empirical research project and got Zaakirah Roomaney, one of my honours research students, to look at mobile microwork in South Africa. We just wrote up the findings as a conference paper which my colleague/co-researcher Pitso Tsibolane will present at AMCIS, New Orleans, in August. However, I thought it would be useful to mention some of our key findings here as well. (We’ll upload the paper after the conference.)

We sent out a survey request and link via Facebook, soliciting people with mobile micro-work experience or interested in participating. The sample consisted of 125 valid responses of which 70% (n=87) of respondents were female and 30% (n=38) were male. The age distribution was positively skewed with the largest response from the 20-29 years age group which represented 45% (n=17) of the male respondents being male but a fully 71% (n=62) of the female respondents. The education level of the respondents was quite high with 62% of the respondents either have a Diploma or Bachelor degree or above and 37% of the respondents having completed secondary school. 74% of respondents had not participated in any form of microwork while 26% had participated in some form of microwork.

Figure 1 below illustrates the types of microwork that respondents indicated that they would most likely (want to) partake in (single response item). The majority of respondents (20%) indicated that would most likely complete surveys if they were to participate in microwork. The second most popular task amongst the respondents was rating services (14%, n=31) followed by mystery shopping (11%, n=33).

Microwork_SA_Fig_1

Figure 1: Tasks Respondents are “most likely to complete

Potential Contribution of Microwork

When we asked what they think the major contribution of microwork could be to a nation, 69 of respondents think that microwork has the potential to decrease unemployment while 35 indicated that microwork has the potential to help a country develop. Interestingly, 11 of respondents are of the opinion that participation in microwork is a new form of exploiting cheap labour.

Microwork_SA_Fig_2

Figure 2: Potential Contribution of Microwork

Key motivators for participating in Mobile Microwork

We also asked them about a number of potential motivating factor as well as barriers. Figure 3 shows to what extent they rated particular motivators/barriers as being important.

Microwork_SA_Fig_3

Figure 3: Motivators for (intended) participation into mobile microwork.

However, more interesting was when we ran a multiple linear regression test to see which of these actually were a statistical predictor for their intended future participation in mobile microwork. It turns out that only payment/remuneration is significant in the model (p = 0.006)> However, the overall multiple regression model has an R² of only 0.13 with an adjusted R² of a measly 0.03 i.e. we could only ‘explain’ 3% of the variance in intended future microwork participation from the usually cited motivators and inhibitors !

More interpretations and full details in the forthcoming publication of the AMCIS paper. Please feel free to comment or contact me directly.

Jean-Paul Van Belle; Centre for IT and National Development in Africa (CITANDA), University of Cape Town (UCT).